I. To the Question

13. We assume the affirmative side as the principal article of faith among the articles that concern temporal things, - and to understand this possibility, three things need to be considered; first, what is to be understood by ‘personal union’; second how it is possible on the part of the person who assumes, that is, that no repugnance is found on this point; third how it is possible on the part of the nature assumed, such that no repugnance is found on this point.

A. What is to be Understood by ‘Personal Union’

14. About the first I say that union does not state anything absolute in a supposit, because when anything absolute is understood in one of the extremes no perfect idea of union is understood, because union is not understood in relation to itself. Therefore whether union is concomitant to something in one extreme or in both, since it is not nothing, it does at least state a respect; but not a common respect, which would be of the same reason in each extreme (of the sort that likeness is), because the disposition in the assumed nature and the assuming person is not of the same reason. Now the assuming person has no real relation to the created assumed nature, from Book I distinction 30 nn.49-51; conversely, however, unless the assumed nature had some relation to the assuming person, nothing would be per se understood by the union.a Nor is the relation in the assumed nature only a thing of reason, because then the union would not be real. This relation then is a real relation of inequality in one extreme, to which no relation in the other extreme corresponds at all, or at least no real relation. And so the relation is a relation of order in one related extreme; but it is not the relation of ‘caused thing to cause’, because that relation is common to the whole Trinity - nor is it a relation of ‘what is caused later to what is caused earlier’, because the Word is not anything caused; therefore it is a relation of order or of dependence that is of a reason different from all dependence in the order of caused to cause, because the relation is universally by reason of nature in one extreme.

a.a [Interpolated note] For ‘union’ is a special relation of dependence and order that is not of the same reason in both extremes: a real relation and not a relation of reason in the united nature, and a relation of inequality.

15. And although it be difficult to see that some dependence is of this sort, yet it can in some way be made clear in the case of subject and accident. For an accident has a double relation to its subject or to substance; namely of in-forming to in-formed, - and this necessarily includes imperfection in the formed subject, namely by the fact that it has potentiality with respect to ‘act in a certain respect’ (because the act is an accidental one); the other relation it has is of the naturally posterior to the prior, on which it depends as on its subject and not as on some cause (because if it has the subject as a cause, it has it as material cause, and this insofar as it in-forms the subject). If then these two relations of accident to subject are distinguished from each other, the one is necessarily a relation to the subject under the idea of imperfection in the subject, namely the imperfection of potentiality - the other, however, does not necessarily posit any imperfection in it but only natural and instantiating priority with respect to the accident.

16. Very similar to this is the dependence of human nature on the divine person, which is without any dependence of the caused on the cause; also it does not have the [divine] nature for first term but the person as it is person, such that just as the entity of nature is of a different idea and of something different from the entity proper to the person as person, so dependence on this sort of being and on that is of a different idea and of a different thing.

B. How Personal Union is Possible on the Part of the Person Assuming

17. About the second point [n.13] I say that if it were repugnant to the divine person thus to assume or to be the term of dependence of human nature, this would be either insofar as it was a divine person or insofar as it was ‘this person’:

Not in the first way, because this dependence does not imply anything repugnant to the divine nature or person (because it implies neither composition, nor potentiality, nor limitation); for it is only necessary that ‘what is the term of this dependence’ be in itself something independent, having entity as is required for being the term of this dependence; nor does any composition or potentiality follow (as is plain), nor any dependence in the divine person, because it is not necessary for the person to be really related but only that it be the term of the dependence of the human nature assumed relatively to it.

Nor second is there any repugnance on the part of the divine person insofar as it is a ‘this’, namely that ‘this one person’ unites and not another, because although a respect consequent to nature by outward respect (as of triple causality) or ‘to be the term of such respect’ is common to the three, and     therefore all causality with respect to the creature belongs to the three, yet it is not necessary that the respect in question here, which is not consequent to quidditative or personal entity, be common to the three (for any independent personal entity can be a sufficient term of this dependence; such is the entity proper to any person, even as it is distinguished from another person; therefore etc     .).

18. But there is another proof of this [from William of Ware], that a divine person contains and includes in itself virtually the perfection of any created person; therefore it can with respect to created nature supply the place of uncreated nature and of created person so as to be the term of dependence of created nature.

19. This argument is deficient in three ways:

First in accord with those who argue like this, because they posit that personal reality in divinity is not a perfection simply; but that which is a reason for containing virtually many perfections and - as relates to itself - infinite perfections, must be a perfection simply; but a divine person, if it contained the realities of one created person, would by parity of reason also contain infinite realities, and so its personal entity would be a perfection simply, which they deny.

20. Further, as perfect a containing exists in the divine essence with respect to created nature as exists in a divine person with respect to a created person, nay even more so, because the divine essence is absolutely infinite, but not so the personal entity; but the essence cannot of its perfection be formally the essence of any created person so as to take the place formally of the created nature, however much it contains it virtually; therefore much more is the person not able to supply for the created person with respect to created personhood.

21. Hence it is not because of the perfection of personal entity that the person contains virtually any created personhood, but because the personal entity is independent, - and as independent, insofar as it is such, it can be the term of dependence on it of something else which is of a nature to have such a term; but this dependence is of a nature to have the person for term and not the nature; therefore an independent divine person can sufficiently be the term of such dependence on it of the created nature.

C. How Personal Union is Possible on the Part of the Assumed Nature

22. The third article is more difficult, because one must show the distinction of created nature from created personhood.

1. The Opinion of Others

23. The proposed conclusion is proved in this opinion [of William Ware] in three ways:

First, because singularity naturally precedes personhood; therefore God can influence for singularity as for what is naturally prior without influencing for personhood, and so he can - in the instant in which a singular nature should be per se in a person -prevent it from being a person in itself and to be so in another instead.

24. Second, because “that which is of one genus can have the mode of another genus” (as is plain of an accident existing per se in the Eucharist), - therefore just as an accident can have the mode of substance (as is plain there), so substance can have the mode of accident and conversely, namely of being dependent; but once this is posited on the part of human nature, which is a substance, the dependence and union stated [n.16] is preserved.

25. Third it is argued that the more things are diverse, the more they can be united with each other (this is plain by induction, because individuals of the same species are least capable of being united; things of diverse genera are more capable than things of the same genus, as is plain of subject and accident); therefore since the created and uncreated are maximally diverse, because they are not of one genus, it follows that they will be most capable of being united, because one is potential with respect to the other.

2. Rejection of the Opinion

26. These reasons do not establish the proposed conclusion.

The first does not because - if it were valid - it would prove that God could make the nature to exist and at the same time not be singular, or if he made it singular first with this singularity, he could make it, while it remained the same, singular with another singularity; for ‘nature as such’ naturally precedes itself as singular. But if it be denied that nature can be made to exist save as singular determinately with this singularity, and that it cannot remain save under the same singularity, much more does this follow about the singular nature and its personhood, because this is its ultimate actuality.

27. The second reason seems to be at fault because the mode that truly is proper to one genus does not belong to anything else of another genus; for just as it is not proper to it, so also it is incompossible with anything else.

28. Nor does what is adduced about a separated accident prove the proposed point, because it does not have the mode that is proper to substance; for substance exists naturally per se, that is, in its existence it is not inclined with natural aptitude to anything else - but it is not so in the case of the separated accident.a

a.a [Interpolation] Nor is the substance formally dependent on the divine person such that the accident is not inclined with natural aptitude to a subject or the nature to its proper personhood.

29. And if the remark of Metaphysics 5.14.1020a33-b13 be adduced that a difference in the case of substance has the mode of quality, I reply: the Philosopher does not understand this of the proper mode of quality as a genus, but intends there to posit a distinction in this word ‘quality’, and that ‘one of its mode is that according to which a difference in the case of substance is called quality’. This mode of the word ‘quality’ does not belong to any species of the genus of quality as it is a genus, nor is the mode proper to the genus of quality, but is only a mode of what is ‘quality’ in general. Therefore in the issue at hand one must show that the distinction between created nature and created personhood is from something else than from this.

30. The third reason does not seem conclusive, because the reason of the major is that because of potentiality in one extreme and because of actuality in the other extreme they are not univocal in fact, since they are primarily diverse (as is plain of subject and accident, which are disposed to each other as potency and act); this reason is not conclusive about things maximally distant, namely the Word and created nature, because neither is the Word formally the act of the created nature nor conversely is created nature formally potential with respect to the Word, because then they would be of a nature to become naturally one thing.

3. Scotus’ own Opinion

31. Therefore because of this third article it is necessary to see the manner of the disposition by which an intellectual nature is said to be a ‘person’, in comparison with the manner of it by which such a nature is singular and individual.

32. And it is plain that what it is individuated formally and ultimately by is not the same as ‘this created personhood’ by which it is a person, because - according to Damascene bk.3 ch.3 - God assumed our nature in an individual but not however a nature in a person.

a. Two Possible Ways of Solution

33. But as to what the property is by which the nature is a person there seem to be two possible ways: one, that it is a person by something positive in final nature (final as that by which it is a nature and an individual nature), and this whether the positive thing is absolute or relative; in another way, that it is a person by mere addition of negation.

34. The first could be posited in some way proportionally to what was said in Book II on individuation, in distinction 3 nn.168-188, that just as there is some proper reality by which a nature is a ‘this’ over and above that by which it is nature, and that the latter is not formally the former, so over and above each of these there would be some reality by which it is a person; and so neither of these would be formally the same as person.

35. The second denies that any positive reality is the person, and it posits the reality - by which it is a ‘this’ - to be the final positive entity, and that over and above this there is only some negation, by which it is said to be ‘subsistent in intellectual nature’ and a person.

b. Arguments against the First Way

36. Against the first way I give four arguments:

First, because then there would be some positive entity in human nature that was not capable of being assumed by the Word. - Proof of the consequence: for this final entity, which person adds over and above the singular, would be repugnant by contradiction to being communicated the way the nature is communicated to the supposit (as is plain, because “a person is incommunicable existence” [Richard of St. Victor On the Trinity IV chs.21-23]), and so being assumed would be repugnant by contradiction to it. The result seems unacceptable: both because, according to Damascene ch.50, “what cannot be assumed cannot be cured,” - and because every created positive entity is in obediential potentiality with respect to the divine person.

37. Second, because it would follow that the nature, which was already assumed by the Word, would lack this positive entity, which however is posited as the final and most actual and most determinate entity in such nature. And if it not seem unacceptable to concede that this person lacks it, I argue that this nature could not suffer diminishment in itself and not be given another reality than the one it has, namely personhood - or it would remain a non-person, because then it would not be a person without the reality, and in this case it does not have it; therefore it is necessary for the diminished nature to be given it again.

38. Further it follows, third, that the nature could not be diminished and be in a person, because such reality could not be a reality of nature (as was shown in the question, n.26) nor can it be contained by identity in any nature which is not the same as itself; but whatever does not contain some reality by identity while remaining the same cannot contain that reality by identity.

39. Fourth, because it would follow that intellectual nature could come to be and not be in any person; for what is prior could naturally come to be and not be under this reality (because of the fact it is not posited to be really and formally the same as it),a and in the second instant of nature - in which it is assumed by the Word - it would not be necessary for the Word to assume it; therefore the Word would be able not to assume it and so it would be left to itself and then it would not be in a person by any personhood (either created or uncreated!).

a.a [Interpolation] as actually existing, and it would not be in a person, because by the fact that this reality is not posited to be the same as the nature, and that the nature - as nature - is naturally prior to itself as it is under this reality, it could come to be and not be under this reality.

c. Arguments against the Second Way

40. Against the second way there seem to be many arguments:

First, because this negation could only be posited as non-dependence on an extrinsic person; but if this would suffice for proper personhood - that it does not thus depend on it - the separated soul would be a person, which is false according to Richard On the Trinity IV ch.23.

41. The same arguments seem to be against this as are against ‘ungenerated’ being a property constitutive of the Father, Book I distinction 28 nn.1-4, 21; for no negation can of itself be incommunicable but only by affirmation; and so, since it is of the idea of a person to be incommunicable, no person can be formally a person by negation.

42. Likewise, as was argued there [ibid.], no negation can be proper first to any subject but only by some affirmation;a therefore this negation by which a person is a person is not proper to this person unless some affirmation is posited proper to this person, and so it is a person by affirmation before it is by negation.

a.a [Interpolated note] because an absolute and free negation is common to being and to non being.

43. Fourth, because, as was argued in the question ‘On Individuation’ [II d.3 nn.49-57], to be divided is a mark of imperfection, and therefore not everything, by which to be divided is repugnant to something, is a privation but is a positive entity, and from this the conclusion follows that the entity is positive by which nature is individual and undivided. Consequently I argue in the issue at hand: to depend on an extrinsic person is a mark of imperfection; therefore not being dependent or being repugnant to such dependence does not necessarily entail imperfection;a but to be dependent on something else is not repugnant to anything save because of some positive entity.

a.a [Interpolated note] because then the same would be entailed about a divine person.

d. What one should Think about the Two Ways

44. Without asserting, one can mediate between these two ways by denying -with the first way - that there is any positive entity in created intellectual nature which is repugnant by contradiction to being communicated by some communication repugnant to person, because there seems to be no positive entity in created nature that is not capable of being dependent on the Word, and so to be communicable in the same way in which nature is said to be communicated to the supposit, as is the nature by which the supposit is said to be a being in nature (namely, ‘by humanity’ a thing is called ‘man’ and ‘by this humanity’ called ‘this man’). And one should not concede with the second way that mere negation of dependence on an extrinsic person is what is formally completive in the idea of person, because - as was argued at the beginning against it [n.40] - the separated soul would then be a person.

45. But thus one should distinguish between actual, possible, and aptitudinal dependence; and I call the sort of dependence aptitudinal that would always - as far as concerns itself - be in act (in the way that ‘heavy’ is apt by nature to be in the center, where it would always be, as far as concerns itself, unless it were impeded); and ‘possible’ I call absolutely that dependence where there is no impossibility from repugnance or from impossibility of terms (and this possibility can be sometimes with respect to a supernatural active power, and not only a natural one).

46. Although therefore merely negation of ‘actual’ dependence does not suffice for the proposed conclusion, nor could negation of the third dependence [sc. possible dependence] on the Word be posited in created nature (for there is no created nature or entity to which dependence on the Word is repugnant by contradiction), yet negation of ‘aptitudinal’ dependence on the Word can be conceded in the created nature that is a person in itself, otherwise it would rest by violence in created nature (as a stone rests upwards by violence). And so this negation, not of actual but aptitudinal dependence, as such completes the idea of ‘person’ in intellectual nature and of ‘supposit’ in created nature.

47. Yet neither does this aptitudinal non-dependence posit repugnance to actual dependence, because although there is not an aptitude in such a nature for depending, there is yet an aptitude of obedience, because the nature is in perfect obedience for depending, by the action of a supernatural agent; and when such dependence is given to it, it is a person with the personhood on which it depends - but when it is not given, it is a person in itself by this negation formally, and not by any positive addition over and above the positive entity by which it is ‘this nature’.

e. To the Arguments against the Second Way

48. From this to the arguments against the way of negation.

The answer to the first [n.40] is plain [n.44].

49. To the other one [n.41], when it is argued that ‘negation of itself is not communicable’, my response is as was stated in Book I d.23 n.16 or d.25 nn.6-7.

The incommunicable that pertains to the idea of person excludes a double communicability, namely communicable as ‘what’ and communicable as ‘by what’; created nature is incommunicable in the first way, because it is singular by singularity in the first way (for a singular is not communicable as ‘what’ unless it is unlimited, as is the divine essence); but created nature is not incommunicable in the second way,a understanding by ‘incommunicable’ a negation of communication simply, namely negation of actual and aptitudinal communication, but without understanding formal repugnance to either communication.

a.a [Interpolation] unless the supposit is ‘what has nature by itself’ or is a being having quiddity. Person is incommunicable in both ways.

50. On the contrary: in that case it does not seem that ‘person’ exists univocally in divine reality and in creatures, because there is something in divine reality that is formally incommunicable (as that to which being communicated in either way is repugnant), here there is not - rather created nature does not seem to be a person because it does not have the definition of person.

I reply: this concept of ‘incommunicable’, because it denies actual and aptitudinal communication, is univocal to God and creatures, to divine and created person; for negation is univocal to many things, when the ‘same affirmation’ is denied of several things. But negation ‘of a communicability that includes repugnance to being communicated’ is not univocal, because it does not belong to creatures. Hence if ‘incommunicable’, as it pertains to the idea of perfect person, states not only the negation ‘incommunicable’ for actual or aptitudinal communication but also a negation along with repugnance for affirmation of communication, there will be no person perfectly a person save a divine person; for a divine person has absolutely something by which there is a repugnance for it to be in any way communicated.

And hereby is plain how this reason earlier proved the intended conclusion about ‘ungenerated’ [n.41] but does not do so here; for a divine person not only has negation of actual and aptitudinal communication but also has repugnance for communication both as ‘what’ and as ‘by what’; such repugnance can never exist save through a positive entity -and therefore it never follows that a divine person is without such entity. But a created person is not thus incommunicable; and therefore there is no need to attribute to it such personal entity.

This assertion can be easily seen if we see the difference between bare negation of act and negation of aptitude and negation that requires repugnance. The first is in the ‘heavy’ when it exists above in respect of the ‘where’ in the center; the second is in a black surface with respect to ‘white’, if it is in neither of the potencies for it; the third is in man with respect to ‘irrational’. And although negation has one idea in itself, yet it is distinguished by comparison with what its respect is in. - So here: negation of potency to depend belongs to no creature; negation of aptitude belongs to any nature capable in itself of being a person, even if it actually does depend, because the aptitude in nature is not concomitant to the supernatural act, since the nature is only in obediential potency to that act; the negation of act is in the separated soul. Nor is only the second negation or only the third sufficient for being made a person in itself, but both together are so without the first, which is something that cannot be had.

51. To the third argument [n.42] I say that negation cannot be called ‘proper’, because it is not communicable as ‘what’ to many things, - and so negation in creatures is proper through the positive entity by which the nature is a ‘this’, to which is repugnant its being communicated as ‘what’ to many things; or it can be understood to be proper as incommunicable to another as ‘by what’, and thus in creatures it is not proper by affirmation.

52. To the fourth [n.43] I concede that if to depend were repugnant to any created thing, it would necessarily be repugnant to it through something positive; but it cannot be repugnant to any creature, because every created entity not only depends on the uncreated as on its cause but can also depend ‘by this special dependence’.

4. A Doubt

53. But about this third article [nn.13, 22] there is another doubt: whether there is some entity that is absolute, new, and positive for the foundation of this new relation, namely of dependence on and union with the Word, such that, with this posited, the relation of it to the Word cannot not follow.

54. It seems that there is, because otherwise there would first be a change toward relation and from relation, because if the Word were to let go the absolute nature assumed, the relation of union would not exist and - for you [n.37] - nothing would be absolute; therefore the change would be first from the relation (in this way, if it were to assume a nature first made to be a person in Peter). If there were no need for some new absolute to come to be, so that it might be made a person by the Word, the first term of this change would be a new relation; but this consequent is contrary to the Philosopher Physics 5.2.225b11-13, because there is no motion, either of principle or of term, in the category of ‘relation to another’. There is a confirmation from reason too, that a relation does not seem to be new unless there is something new in one of the extremes; for if something is disposed in altogether the same way in itself, then it is also so disposed to another; there is nothing new in the Word in itself nor in the nature assumed unless some new absolute is consequent to it;     therefore such an absolute needs to be posited.

55. But the opposite seems more probable:

Because the ‘absolute’ would be necessarily united to the Word such that, just as it is impossible for the union to exist and not be to the Word as to its term, so it would be incompossible for that absolute - which is the necessary foundation of the union - to exist save in the person of the Word; there seems to be no such absolute entity in a creature; therefore etc     .

56. Further, such an absolute entity, in order to be the foundation of union with the Word, would be either accidental or substantial. Not accidental, because substantial nature seems to be what is first capable of being a person in itself (speaking of intellectual nature), namely insofar as it is prior to any accident; therefore when it is a person in something, it seems to be a person prior to any accident - and so no accident is the proper reason for being a person, and consequently not for this union either. If it is substantial, it cannot be that it is something other than what can exist in created nature, because then some matter or form, or some composite substance, would exist in Christ according to his humanity for which there would be nothing of the same reason in another man - therefore it would be a substantial entity but the same as matter or form or composite substance; but whatever is the same as some substance remains while that substance remains; therefore the assumed nature could not be removed by the Word while that absolute entity remains.

57. To what was said from the Philosopher in the Physics [n.56], one can reply that a relation can be disposed to a foundation in three ways:

In one way, that the foundation cannot, without contradiction, be posited in the absence of the relation, because the foundation cannot without contradiction exist in the absence of the term of the relation; nor even in the absence of relation to the term, because such relation necessarily requires such a term for its own existence. Of this sort are the relations of creatures to God, insofar as they are creatures and he is creator. This sort of relation is the same really as the foundation, as is plain from 2 d.1 n.260.

58. In another way a foundation can exist in the absence of relation because it can exist in the absence of a term; however when it and the term are posited, the relation necessarily follows, such that the two - posited together - are the necessary cause of the relation, whether in one extreme or both. An example would be about likeness in one white thing and in another white thing.

59. In another way, a relation can non-necessarily follow a foundation, because the foundation does not necessarily co-require a term or a relation to a term; and also, when the foundation and term are posited, the relation does not necessarily follow on both extremes or on one, but is contingently said to happen to the extreme, even after any absolute in it and in the term have been posited in being. And in this way one should not posit any new absolute in one of the extremes, even given that the relation is new. Many relations are disposed in this way, as generally the unions of absolute to absolute; for if the form existed per se and the matter existed per se (as a separate organic body and a separate soul), or if the subject existed per se and the accident per se (as bread and quantity in the Eucharist), and if they are again united, then no new absolute exists in either extreme, but the relation is disposed contingently, so that it could also exist or not exist when the extremes were posited.

60. Then, in response to the Philosopher [n.54], I concede that there is no motion or change toward a relation that is disposed in the first or second way [nn.57-58], and so in general not toward relation in the category of relation, as he himself says about the category of relation [Physics 5.1-2.225b5-11]. But it is different with relation said in the third way [n.59], for this is a respect coming extrinsically from outside; that is, it is not an intrinsic respect consequent necessarily (not with absolute necessity, but once the term to which the relation is a relation is posited) to the foundation, namely to quantity or quality or substance, which are present intrinsically. Other respects, which do not in this way necessarily follow the foundation intrinsically, even when the term is posited, are said to come extrinsically from outside; and some perhaps belong to the six principles, which are said to come extrinsically from outside.Vatican editors: The Book of Six Principles ch.1 n.14, divides Aristotle’s ten categories into two groups: the first four (substance, quantity, quality, relation) it says are respects that come intrinsically from inside; the remaining six (action, passion, when, where, position, having) it says are respects that come extrinsically from outside; and the book deals only with these six; Scotus 4 d.13 q.1 n.9, Quodlibet q.11 n.13. ¹ So there is no change toward a new relation in the category of relation, because it only arises de novo because of a newness in the absolute in either extreme; for it is always a respect in the first or second way [nn.57-58].

61. However there can be a change toward a respect coming extrinsically from outside, without newness of any absolute in what it is in or in the terms; indeed there can be motion as well toward this sort of respect, because according to Aristotle Physics 5.2.226a18-26, when he says there is no motion in relation [n.54], he says that motion is per se to a ‘where’, and yet ‘where’a does not state an absolute form but only a respect in a body contained in a containing place; and this respect belongs to the above stated mode [sc. the third].

a.a [Interpolation] the ‘where’, of which he is speaking, since it only arises because of a newness of some absolute in either extreme, is also always in the first or second of the stated modes [nn.57-58]. But as to relation disposed in the third way - because it arises extrinsically, that is, does not necessarily point to an intrinsic foundation, namely to quantity or quality or substance, but follows contingently without newness of any absolute in that in which it is or in the term - there can be change toward this relation; and some such relations perhaps belong to the six classes or principles which are said to come extrinsically from outside. Hence, even according to Aristotle, there is motion toward a ‘where’.